JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
The Demand and Supply of Protection
All individuals possess a positive demand for protection; and as price declines, they increase the quantity they demand. Accordingly, the demand curve for protection slopes downward and to the right, as in Figure 1 . 4 The precise slope is a function of societal preferences (which are considered to be exogenous) and the availability of substitutes (which, given the nature of protection, tend to be few), suggesting that demand is relatively inelastic and the curve correspondingly steep. Although theoretically possible, it is unlikely that the demand for protection is perfectly inelastic (i.e., that the demand curve is perpendicular to the horizontal axis), since this implies that society is willing to pay virtually any price for even small amounts of the service. To the extent that society places any value on goods and services other than protection, or, if there is any trade-off between guns and butter, the demand curve must possess at least a slight negative slope. It is equally unlikely that the demand for protection can be saturated. Historical experience suggests that even high levels of defense spending do not create feelings of total security. To the extent that the security dilemma holds at all (Jervis 1978) , the demand for protection can be sated not at some high level of military spending but, rather, only in a world where everyone else is completely disarmed.5 In short, under most feasible conditions, the demand curve for protection is sensitive to price.
The level of protection demanded by society, in turn, is primarily a function of the level of external threat. The greater the external threat, ceteris paribus, the higher the demand for protection will be. This is depicted in Figure 1 as a shift outward in the demand curve (D' > D).
As in any monopoly, the state enjoys some measure of market power and can, within the limits set by the demand schedule, control the quantity of the good (protection) supplied; and as with any profit-maximizing firm, the state will set its output at the level that equates marginal cost with marginal revenue and charge what the market will bear.6 In Figure 1 , price p represents the normal profit level; but since in all monopolies the profit-maximizing level of production lies below the demand curve, the final price charged to consumers will be higher and may be as high as r. The difference between p and the price charged, say r, defines the rent or supernormal profit earned by the state-represented graphically by the rectangle p-r-a-b.7
Unlike other monopolists, however, states can also act opportunistically against their own societies by artificially increasing the demand for their services through extortion or racketeering. Extortion occurs when states magnify, exaggerate, or "oversell" foreign threats to society, whether by supplying incomplete information or engaging in outright deception (see Ames and Rapp 1977; Lowi 1967) . States conduct protection rackets by actively creating foreign threats, from which they then protect society (see Tilly 1985).
In both cases, a state effectively shifts the demand curve outward (D' > D) and thereby earns greater rents (p'-r'-a'-b' > p-r-a-b).
Two important points follow from this analysis. First, the level of protection supplied by the monopoly state will always be less than that produced under conditions more closely approximating "pure competition."8 While society would benefit from higher levels of protection, given prevailing costs of production, the profit-maximizing or optimal strategy for the state is to restrict supply-whether it can successfully capture the potential rents or not. Insecurity is an inherent feature of life under the modern state.
Second, the state faces strong incentives to seek rents at the expense of society. In other words, the state can benefit itself by charging consumers the monopoly price for protection (r in Figure 1 ) and by artificially inflating demand through extortion or racketeering.
Societal Constraints on State Rent Seeking
Consumers clearly prefer to purchase protection at the lowest sustainable price (p in Figure 1 ). The state, on the other hand, clearly prefers to sell protection at the highest possible price, which is determined by the slope of the demand curve and represented by r.
The actual price-and the level of rents extracted from society-is determined by how well individual citizens can control or regulate the rent-seeking behavior of the state. Society's ability to control the state, in turn, is influenced by the costs of three separate activities: monitoring state behavior, voice, and exit (see Hirschman 1970) .
In order to control the state, individuals must first monitor its performance and acquire information on the strategies it is pursuing, its real costs of protection production, the level of foreign threat, and the like. Monitoring the state is analogous to principal-agent problems in publicly held corporations, where the stockholders (the principals) seek to ensure that the managers (the agents) work hard and faithfully in their interests.9 The "problem" arises because no single stockholder typically has any incentive to invest in, or acquire information on, the manager's true performance-information, of course, it is assumed that the managers themselves possess. Collective action problems also stymie any group investment in information. The higher the costs of acquiring information, the less control the stockholders can exert over the firm and the more the managers can shirk or adopt policies that benefit themselves at the expense of their principals. The same is true of the statesociety problem: no single citizen has any incentive to invest in information; and, because of the free-rider problem, collective investment in information occurs only at suboptimal levels.10 The higher the costs of acquiring information regarding state performance, the greater latitude state officials possess to engage in rent-seeking behavior.
Once performance and the level of state rents have been assessed, individuals have two instruments through which to alter or change state behavior: exit and voice. Through exit, individuals move and deplete both the resource base of the state, raising its real costs, and its market for protection, lowering the price it can charge. Discipline is imposed upon the state, in other words, by reducing its profits, thereby punishing it for undesirable behavior.
As Hirschman notes, exit is the quintessential economic strategy: if a consumer ceases to like a product, he or she simply stops purchasing it (1970, 15). Consumers of state-provided services do not have quite the same freedom. Because protection is a public good supplied by a local monopoly, individuals cannot choose to consume varying amounts or qualities; indeed, because it is coercively supplied, individuals cannot choose whether or not to consume any protection at all. Nonetheless, political exit can occur, although it takes different forms and usually entails a higher cost than exit from private goods consumption. Individuals can choose to migrate or "vote with their feet" (or assets), moving from highrent to low-rent areas.11 Freedom of emigration is often one of the first rights obtained in the process of democratization (as was recently witnessed in Eastern Europe), suggesting that the right to exit and democracy will tend to be conjoined, with the former serving as the ultimate guarantor against failures of the latter. Similarly, territories can secede or threaten to secede. If large enough, they can try to form an independent state or, failing that, they can try to merge with other secessionist or democratic territories into a larger union. While possible, exit is costly to the individuals or territories that choose it. The higher the cost of exit, the greater the ability of the state to earn rents.
Voice, or political participation, disciplines the state by separating or threatening to separate state officials from their offices: the citizens stay, but the composition of the state changes. Voice can take many forms, from voting, to campaign contributions, to mass unrest, to active rebellion.
At the individual level, the costs of political participation are unevenly distributed across society. This occurs for a host of idiosyncratic reasons. For instance, not all countries have universal suffrage, the opportunity cost of a campaign contribution is significantly less for a multimillionaire than for a welfare family, and the military can overthrow a leader with greater ease than can unarmed civilians. At the aggregate or national level, the costs of political participation vary by regime type. For instance, in most democracies, where elections are the primary focus of political participation for the majority of citizens, it is relatively costless to vote and exercise voice.12 At the other extreme, autocratic states typically suppress political dissent; and voting, if it occurs at all, is ineffective in removing officials from power. In these countries, to replace, or effectively threaten to replace, a ruler requires either mass unrest or some form of armed rebellion-activities that carry considerably higher individual costs, including the possibility of death. In these polities, voice is very costly to the average citizen and, as a result, is seldom exercised. It follows that the higher the costs of political participation, on average, the greater the state's ability to earn rents will be.13 The relatively low cost of political participation in democracies constrains the state's rent-seeking ability, whereas the relatively high cost of political participation in autocracies frees the state to earn rents.
In determining its level of feasible rents, the state will act as a discriminating monopolist, charging citizens in general and each separate citizen in particular a price for protection positively related to the costs of monitoring, exit, and political participation. Indeed, the state will charge up to-but in equilibrium not more than-the price at which individuals would be tempted either to exit or to engage in the lowest-cost form of political participation available to them that would effectively remove current state officials from power.
Expansion and the Rent-seeking State
In practice, there are always positive costs of monitoring state behavior and exercising voice and exit. As a result, all states possess some ability to earn rents, although the ability will be larger in autocracies than in democracies for the reasons just surveyed. To the extent that a state can earn rents, state and societal interests will diverge and the state will be biased toward an expansionary foreign policy.14 This relationship is continuous. The higher the costs to society of controlling the state, the greater will be the rentseeking ability of the state, the more the interests of state and society will diverge, and the more expansionist the state will become.15 This imperialist bias arises for three reasons.
First, expansion may increase the state's rent-seeking ability by reducing the benefits of exit. The net benefit of exit to any individual (and thus that individual's incentive to engage in this action) is determined by both the push of high rents at home and the pull of lower rents abroad. When all states extract equally high rents, there is no incentive to move. If through expansion a state can eliminate or engulf a low-rent competitor, it increases its own ability to earn rents. This suggests that low-rent states will often be objects of expansion for rent-seeking autocracies.
Second, a state may also expand so as to provoke others into threatening its own society. Both extortion and racketeering rest upon persuading citizens that foreign threats are larger and more real than they are or otherwise would be. If successful, the state convinces consumers to increase their demand for protection and, in turn, earns more rents. Even with incomplete and costly information, however, citizens may eventually discern the true level of threat and lower their demand. Through expansion short of universal empire, the state lends credibility to extortion and supports racketeering, thereby strengthening its ability to earn rents at the expense of society.
Third, and most important, the larger the state's rent-seeking ability, the higher the total revenue earned by the state. The more revenue (ceteris paribus), the larger the optimal size of the political unit. These relationships are depicted in Figure 2 .
For all states, an optimal size exists defined by the costs of collecting revenue and producing protection and the revenues earned by providing this service to society. Each additional unit of territory acquired by the state produces additional revenue: the state becomes the new local monopoly supplier of protection, and it taxes consumers in that region accordingly.
On the other hand, the costs of governing rise with the size of the political unit, placing an effective cap on the size of nation-states. These resource costs occur primarily in the form of transactions costs of revenue collection (see Levi 1988; North 1981) . Over some limited range, the state may enjoy increasing returns to scale in revenue collection; but soon, the addition of more territory begins to strain the administrative abilities of the state, leading to diminishing returns.
When combined with the costs of producing protection, the state's total cost curve typically resembles that in Figure 2 . Economies of scale in protection, in conjunction with initial increasing returns in revenue collection, suggest that the slope of the total costcurve declines for some substantial distance, flattens Rents earned by the state, however, cause the total revenue line to rotate counterclockwise from the origin (TR' > TR). Although the total cost curve may also increase as state rent seeking stimulates higher transactions costs of revenue collection, the curve must rise at a lagging rate. Higher state rents do not increase the costs of producing protection from external threats per se, and this is likely to be the major component of the cost curve. And even if the transactions costs of revenue collection increase, because important social groups demand compensation or public unrest must be suppressed, collective action problems thwart a fully countervailing societal response. Assuming for expositional clarity that total costs remain constant, state rent seeking raises total revenue and expands the optimal size of the political unit from 0 to O'. Intuitively, with rents, each unit of territory produces greater revenue for the state. The greater the revenue, the greater the equilibrium costs that can be borne to capture that revenue. Thus, a state with an increased rent-seeking capacity has an incentive to expand until marginal revenue and mar-ginal cost are once again equalized at a new, larger size.
While this expansion (from 0 to O') benefits the state, it harms society. With TR' representing the revenue of a successful rent-seeking state, the line segment b'c' will be the state's economic profit and a'b' its rent, with a'b' being redistributed away from society to state officials. Not only is society exploited by state rent seeking, but it is doubly hurt by the additional expansion rent seeking induces. In the absence of expansion, the state's rents would be ab; with expansion, these rents increase to a'b'. Simple observation suffices to show that a'b' will always be longer than ab.
Both the original citizens or consumers of stateproduced services and the individuals newly incorporated into the territorial unit pay the new higher, expansion-induced price for protection. In other words, greater rents are extracted from both the original and augmented populations, although the exact rate at which these groups will be taxed is determined by their relative costs of controlling the state. The previously foreign population does not bear the burden of the higher rents alone; all consumers in that particular state face a higher price for protection. Imperialism is not simply a means for extracting wealth from "foreign" territories: it is a tool used by the state for exploiting its own society as well.
While this argument has been developed only in terms of a single state service (protection), any rents earned on any service provided by the state increase the optimal size of the political unit. Even if rents are earned from providing, say, the physical infrastructure, the net benefits to the state of providing that good still increase and provide an incentive for further expansion. Fully generalized to all areas of state service, the state optimizes where the marginal revenue (including rents) equals the marginal costs of providing all services and collecting all revenues. Given that the demand for protection is likely to be more inelastic than the demand for other state services, however, the highest rents are likely to be earned in this industry. Nor is there any apparent reason why societal constraints on the state should differ significantly across areas of service.16 Hence, it is appropriate to focus on the production of protection. Nonetheless, it is important to note that in a fully generalized theoretical framework, any rents earned by the state are sufficient to generate an imperialist bias.
It is virtually impossible to measure state rents directly. Perhaps in past centuries, when the public fisc and the private purse of the ruler were one and the same, it might have been possible to observe the rents earned by the state by measuring the comparative opulence of the royal court. If the general argument developed here is correct, however, then surely one of the primary tasks of modern state budgeting techniques is to obscure the difference between normal and supernormal state profits. It also follows that in the countries where they are most easily observed, rents will be relatively low-even zero, at the extreme.17 Given these measurement difficulties, no direct test of the theory is possible. Rather, it can be assessed-and the presence of state rents revealed-only by examining the theory's behavioral implications. Accordingly, I shall examine several hypotheses derived from the theory. In doing so, I also provide an explanation for one of the longest-standing puzzles of international relations.
THE PROPENSITY FOR WAR
In a recent review of the literature, Levy writes that (1) "the evidence shows that the proportional frequency of war involvement of democratic states has not been greater than that for nondemocratic states"; (2) "democracies may be slightly less likely than nondemocratic states to initiate wars, but the evidence is not yet conclusive on this question"; and ( This pattern of pacifism only among democratic states is inconsistent with most prevailing theories of international politics (Doyle 1983a, 218-25; Levy 1989, 270) . Realism, which focuses on the universal effects of international anarchy, the security dilemma, and the balance of power, cannot account for the relative pacifism of democracies. This is even more true of its contemporary variant, neorealism, which explicitly abstracts from the domestic characteristics of nationstates. Given the correlation between democratic political structures and capitalism, Marxist-Leninist theories predict a higher incidence of war between democracies. Conversely, liberal economic theory, which highlights the pacifying effects of commerce, predicts a lower overall incidence of democratic war involvement, not just a lower probability of war among democracies.
The most persuasive account of the relative pacifism of democracies was first put forth by Immanuel Kant in 1795, when there were less than a handful of democracies in existence, and has been recently summarized and extended by Doyle (1983a Doyle ( , 1983b Doyle ( , 1986 ; see also Russett 1990, 124-32 The theory I have summarized above offers an alternative explanation for the relative pacifism of democratic states that nonetheless builds upon, and subsumes, many of Kant's essential insights. First, as I have demonstrated, democratic states will tend to be less expansionist than autocratic states. The larger the rent-earning ability of the state, the greater the optimal size of the territorial unit, and the greater the incentives for the state to try to reach this optimal size. To the extent that war is a necessary byproduct of expansion, it follows (ceteris paribus) that autocratic states will be more war-prone. Where, for Kant, republican institutions restrain the capriciousness of the ruler, democracy, in this approach, constrains the ability of the state to extract monopoly rents at society's expense.
Second, the theory suggests that democracies will often be the object of expansion by autocratic states. Democracies pose two threats to the rent-seeking ability of autocracies. As I have noted, democracies, by their very existence, serve as magnets that pull individuals out of autocratic polities; in the absence of a low-rent democratic haven, exit is less likely to occur. By eliminating democracies, autocratic states can reduce the gains from, and incentives for, emigration. In addition, through their political openness and richer informational environments, democratic states reduce the costs to autocratic societies of monitoring state behavior; by observing democracies, citizens in autocracies are more likely to become aware of the magnitude and consequences of state rent seeking.24 Again, by eliminating democracies abroad, autocratic states solidify and reinforce their rent-earning abilities. For both of these reasons, democracies, perhaps unwittingly, may become targets of the expansionary activity of autocracies-thus expanding their overall war involvement despite their own pacific nature.25
Finally, democratic states may engage in expansion and even intervene in other countries, as Doyle claims, but only under restricted conditions. Democracies will expand only when the initial costs of conquest and ongoing costs of rule are less than the discounted present value of future economic profits. Under these conditions, expansion is socially optimal regardless of regime type. Nineteenth-century European imperialism may provide examples of such socially efficient expansion: in many areas of the periphery the cost of war against more "primitive" peoples was relatively low and the potential gain from the erection of a "modern" state with its greater extractive capacity disproportionately large. With the rise of "European-style" states in the periphery dur-ing the twentieth century, however, the cost of imperialist expansion has substantially increased, apparently foreclosing this option.
By the same principle, democracies may also preemptively intervene in the domestic affairs of an autocracy to construct democratic political structures as long as the costs of the intervention are less than the expected costs of a war stimulated by state rent seeking. In this view, the proactive policy of democracies rests not on a moral imperative but on a rational calculus of preemption.
Together, these propositions imply that democracies are, on average, no more or less war prone than other states. On the other hand, democracies are less likely to fight each other, for only in this area is the absence of an imperialist bias manifest. Indeed, the almost complete lack of war between democracies suggests just how important state rent seeking may be as a source of international conflict.
THE PROPENSITY FOR VICTORY
Democracies are not only less likely to wage war with each other, they are also significantly more likely to win the wars they fight against autocracies. Liberalism offers a possible explanation for this correlation: democracies tend to turn international conflicts into ideological crusades and demand total victory.26 Yet, as I have noted, the micro motives for democratic crusading are, at best, unclear. Moreover, within this framework, ideological fervor need not translate into victory; for the fear that the winner will transform the loser's social structure may only spur the failing side onto greater efforts. The drive for victory need not yield the desired result.
The theory summarized in Part I suggests a second explanation. To the extent that democratic states earn fewer rents, it follows that they tend (1) to create fewer economic distortions, possess greater national wealth, and devote more resources to security; (2) to enjoy greater societal support for their policies and therefore a greater extractive capacity; and (3) to form overwhelming countercoalitions against expansionist autocracies. I shall develop each of these propositions in turn.
State rents, like the rents earned by private actors, distort patterns of production and consumption, divert resources into directly unproductive activity, create social deadweight losses, and thereby reduce the total product of goods and services within an economy. While the successful rent earner is better off, the economy as a whole suffers. At the very least, growth rates lag behind their potential. North (1981) has examined the effects of state rent seeking on property rights and, in turn, growth; but the argument is more general.27 Any state rents, including monopoly rents earned through the exchange of state-produced services such as protection, distort the economy and, over time, lower national wealth relative to its potential.28
The wealthier the country (ceteris paribus), the more absolute resources it devotes to producing security. For any given set of costs and preferences, wealthier countries produce and consume greater amounts of all goods and services, including protection; under normal conditions, an increase in wealth affects only the level, not the mix, of goods in the economy. It follows, then, that wealthier countries produce and consume greater amounts of security (i.e., provide greater absolute resources to the state for producing protection). In contests where sheer resources matter, the cumulative effects of lower state rents may prove decisive. Democratic states should also possess greater societal support for their policies, suggesting that they will enjoy a greater extractive capacity for any given level of national wealth. All societies make trade-offs between consuming what are mostly private goods and services and consuming state-produced protection; while both constitute current consumption, the latter serves as insurance that societies will be able to enjoy their present and future holdings of wealth. During hostilities, when the external threat to national wealth, territorial integrity, and the present form of rule is most acute, individuals and, in turn, society will tend to purchase greater quantities of protection (pay higher taxes), thereby transferring greater resources to the state for the waging of war.
In view of their exploitative nature, however, autocratic states pose a greater threat than do nonautocratic states to the current and future ability of democratic societies to produce and consume wealth; as a result, democracies should demand greater protection against these threats and contribute proportionately more to ensure victory in war. Within the theory developed here, individuals are indifferent between being ruled by two equally democratic regimes; each provides similar levels of protection close to the normal profit price (p in Figure 1) . As a result, there is no incentive for citizens of one democracy to purchase protection against another equally democratic state unless there is some uncertainty about the likely behavior of the democratic conqueror. Autocratic states, on the other hand, provide protection only at a higher price, with the difference between the normal profit and higher prices (p and r in Figure 1) being captured by the state as rents. In this case, citizens of democracies do possess incentives to purchase protection against this threat to their current and future wealth; indeed, the greater the expected rent seeking from an autocratic conqueror, the more protection citizens will demand, and pay for, from their present democratic state.
Conversely, autocratic societies may actually benefit from defeat-if the victorious democratic states remake the autocracies in their own images. As a result, societies in autocratic polities should be willing to contribute proportionately less than democratic societies. While autocratic states will seek to offset this tendency by vilifying the enemy (instilling fear that defeat will mean national destruction, rape, and slavery), a fifth column remains a real possibility. Autocracies may also increase the degree of coercion used to extract resources; but this implies higher transactions costs for revenue collection, which will further disadvantage them relative to democracies. At the very least, the lack of societal support places a real constraint on their extractive capabilities. Lamborn's (1983, 1991) study of the great powers during the late nineteenth century supports this expectation, as does the tendency of states to expand the franchise or otherwise liberalize politically during or immediately after major wars.
Finally, to the extent that states balance threats, rather than power (as Walt [1987] has argued and as is consistent with the logic I have developed), democratic states should form overwhelming countercoalitions against autocratic states. Not only are autocracies more likely to seek territorial expansion, they are more likely to target democracies (to reduce exit options). In addition, autocratic expansion poses a greater threat to democracies because of the larger rents the state is likely to extract if successful. The greater the threat (ceteris paribus), the greater the balancing reaction by other states.
Given its imperialist bias and likely behavior if successful, the threat posed by an autocracy is proportionately greater than the sum of its aggregate resources, the traditional measure of national power. It follows that the countercoalition that forms against any autocracy should be disproportionately large or overwhelming. If autocracies have greater incentives to expand, democracies have greater incentives to resist. As a result, this coalition should also be disproportionately composed of democractic states.30 The overlarge "democratic" coalition should deter autocratic expansion (by raising the costs of conquest) and, if deterrence fails, be more likely to win. Combined with the greater wealth and extractive capabilities of the individual states, this suggests that the democratic coalition should be virtually invincible. Rather than relying upon a simple dichotomy, it is possible to examine the average degree of democracy in the sets of winners and losers of these 26 wars. Using an 11-point scale of democracy (0-10), the mean of the 70 winners is 5.60 and the mean of the 51 losers is 2.55.31 The probability that these figures would emerge by chance is less than .001 (t = 4.43; df = 119).
Finally, the relationship between democracy and victory is quite robust. levels in both equations, suggesting that in this set of wars neither military nor economic strength is associated with victory. When included, war initiation is significant but in the wrong direction; surprisingly, in wars between democracies and autocracies, noninitiators win more frequently. The failure of these alternative explanations to predict victory or loss correctly does not imply that common sense or previous research is wrong. Rather, it highlights the exceptional nature of war between democracies and autocracies. In these conflicts, military strength, industrial capacity, and the ability to choose to wage war appear to be far less important determinants of victory than governmental form.
CONCLUSION
Regime type does matter in international politics. Democracies are less likely to fight wars with each other. They are also more likely to prevail in wars with autocratic states. This syndrome of powerful pacifism accords, in part, with "Kantian" liberalism; but because of inconsistent behavioral assumptions, this normative frame cannot be said to constitute a positive theory of international relations.
I have offered an alternative explanation drawn from the macroeconomic theory of the state. Specifically, state rent-seeking creates an imperialist bias in a country's foreign policy. This bias is smallest in democracies, where the costs to society of controlling the state are relatively low, and greatest in autocracies, where the costs are higher. As a result, autocracies will be more expansionist and, in turn, war prone. To the extent that democracies do wage occasional wars of expansion, intervene in the domestic affairs of autocracies, and are targets of autocratic expansion, there should be no significant overall difference in their frequency of war involvement. Only in their relations with each other does the relative pacifism of democracies appear. In addition, democracies (constrained by their societies from earning rents) create fewer economic distortions and possess greater national wealth, enjoy greater societal support for their policies, and tend to form overwhelming counter-coalitions against expansionist autocracies. Thus, democracies will be more likely to win wars.
If democracies are powerful pacifists, why do autocracies persist within the international system? It follows from the arguments I have outlined that democracy is an evolutionarily superior and stable form of rule. If so, why has democracy not displaced autocracy?
On the one hand, democracy has expanded. The number of democratic countries has grown from a mere handful in the eighteenth century to over 60 in the early 1980s.33 The recent transformations in Eastern Europe suggest the promise of further liberalizations elsewhere, although in my opinion the tide could easily be reversed. But given the relative infrequency of war, there is no reason to presume that political change will be rapid; the evolutionary pace of the global system may well be glacial.
On the other hand, democracies only tend to win wars; historically, for every four they win, they lose one. Nor is there any consistent trend in favor of the democracies: autocracies were most successful in the 1960s, winning half of the wars in which they were engaged, but entirely unsuccessful in the 1970s and 1980s (see Appendix). Any evolution toward greater democracy is likely to be characterized by fits and starts. Four steps forward, one step back.
APPENDIX: ALL WARS INVOLVING DEMOCRATIC STATES, 1816-1988
In the following list, boldface in the righthand column indicate democratic states. Bulgaria, Romania, Italy/Sardinia, and France which fought on both sides of World War II are listed here on their initial sides. 2. This theory has also been referred to as the neoclassical theory of the state (North 1981 ) and the predatory theory (Levi 1983 (Levi , 1988 ). Both of these appellations have misleading normative implications. I prefer the more neutral term used here. See also Auster and Silver 1979. Within this approach there is some disagreement about the objective that states pursue. North and Levi, for instance, both assume that states maximize revenue, while I assume that states seek profits. For an elaboration of this debate and defense of the profitmaximizing assumption, see Lake 1990.
3. In producing protection and collecting revenues, the state consumes resources-everything from paper clips and stationary to stealth bombers and nuclear weapons. States also consume labor. As noted, the real cost of these resources is determined by their fair market value or (in cases where the state is a dominant consumer) the price the state could obtain if it exercised its monopsonist power-a factor much more important for weapons than, say, for office supplies.
4. The public nature of the good protection complicates the definition of price and demand. By price, I mean the rate at which the state extracts wealth (for practical purposes, the tax rate [t] multiplied by the inverse of the probability (p) of successful evasion (free riding); that is, price = t(I -p). By positive demand I mean that individuals prefer some level of protection at some positive cost to themselves (i.e., price) to no protection at zero cost. Strictly speaking, the demand for public goods is summarized in an evaluation schedule, which differs from a traditional demand curve only in that individual preferences are added vertically, rather than horizontally, in order to reflect nonrivalry in consumption. Following common practice, I nonetheless refer to this evaluation schedule as a demand curve. On the treatment of public goods within a Marshallian economic framework, see the seminal work by Buchanan (1968) . My approach differs from that of Buchanan (who adopts an essentially pluralist approach to politics) by including a theory of the state as a monopoly provider of public goods. This has important implications for the point of equilibrium production. See n. 6. 5. Plotting the probability of success in armed conflict against the quantity of resources mobilized for war, Emmerson (1983, 432) argues that protection forms an S-shaped curve and that once the probability of success reaches 1.0, the country has entered a "zone of redundancy" in which it has "overmobilized." This clearly implies that the demand for protection can be sated. As I have argued however, the security dilemma (and the action-reaction syndrome implied therein) is likely to prevent the probability of success from reaching its upper bounds. Emmerson further argues that charismatic leaders are most likely to arise when the probability of success is in its middling range and that once a state enters the zone of redundancy, it and its leadership will decay. Interestingly, Emmerson's thesis is contradicted by his own evidence. The ancient states of Balti (the focus of his essay) began to decline in 1846 when they were absorbed by the maharaja of Kashmir and, behind him, the British Government of India (p. 438). This absorption, of course, implies that the Balti's probability of military success against these superior powers was significantly less than 1.0.
6. In pure competition, the firm also produces where marginal cost (MC) equals marginal revenue (MR). Facing a horizontal demand curve, however, marginal revenue equals price and, in turn, demand (D); and the competitive firm, in theory, produces where marginal cost equals demand, that is, where MR = D = MC = MR. In Buchanan's (1968) essentially pluralist view, this is also the Pareto optimal equilibrium for the production of public goods and the point against which all distortions must be measured. Adding a concept of the state as a monopoly provider of public goods significantly alters this equilibrium, however. With a downward-sloping monopoly firm demand curve, supplying protection where marginal cost equals demand would result in a significantly larger quantity; but all units to the right of q in Figure 1 would be produced at a loss (MC > MR). What is efficient for society is inefficient for the state, and vice versa. I shall argue that society can control, in part, the quantity of monopoly rents earned by the state; likewise, society can control in part the level of production, with the resulting equilibrium arising somewhere between MR = MC (the state's preferred level) and MC = D (society's preferred level). For expositional clarity, I shall assume henceforth that production occurs where MR = MC and that political conflict occurs primarily over the level of monopoly rents earned by the state. Relaxing this assumption, however, only reinforces my arguments on democracy and the syndrome of powerful pacifism.
7. At the minimum, the protection service must generate normal profits for state officials, defined as the reservation wage; if the state fails to earn at least normal profits, the individuals who comprise it will leave and assume other employment.
8. This conclusion follows even without the assumption advanced in n. 6 as long as society faces positive costs for monitoring state behavior and engaging in exit and voice.
9 12. Although the direct costs for voting are small to nil, there are certainly opportunity costs for activities forgone and possibly some indirect costs (e.g., transportation to the polling station).
13. This is not to deny that some groups within autocratic polities can participate at relatively low cost and thus have significant influence over the state. In these circumstances, it is expected that the powerful social groups would share in the rents earned by the state. The argument here hinges on the average cost for society as a whole. See also n. 15.
14. Expansionary policy is to be taken in opposition to unilateralism and cooperation. See Lake 1990, 1991. This analysis contrasts with other explanations of so-called overexpansion or with a country's expansion beyond the point where the marginal costs equal the marginal gains to society. Rather than being driven by perverse incentives within the international system, cognitive bias, dominant social groups, or log rolls between concentrated social interests (see Snyder 1991), the explanation developed here focuses on the monopoly structure of the protection industry and the costs to society of regulating state behavior.
15. This argument applies only for rents earned and retained by the state. If the state is merely a conduit for redistributing wealth between social groups, no imperialist bias will emerge. Thus, I differ crucially from much of the extant literature on rent seeking, which tends to focus on the actions of social groups (e.g., Olson 1982) . While social rent seeking will reduce national wealth as well, I have yet to see a convincing argument that democracies are more prone to social rent seeking than autocracies. Interestingly, even though Olson adopts a pluralist conception of the state, he argues that his theory is supported by evidence from both developed democracies and nondemocratic, non-Westernized polities (1982, 21. Doyle distinguishes between strong and weak autocrats, suggesting that democracies will not war with the former (a point consistent with my analysis below) but will fail to take advantage of mutually advantageous agreements (such as arms control) or opportunities to exploit such states. I question the extent to which this "stylized fact" holds, as democracies often do ally with one autocrat against another even in times of peace. The United States, for instance, played the "China card" in the 1970s. Nonetheless, to the extent that this tendency does exist, it cannot be reconciled with the theory summarized here.
22. Although only implied in their writings, this emphasis on forgoing material gains and incurring material losses is essential for both Kant and Doyle; in its absence, democratic pacifism is not moral but is economically efficient-a position that both authors claim to supersede. 23. Several scholars have recently attempted to formalize a model of foreign policy decisionmaking that focuses on the greater domestic constraints democratic societies exert on their leaders. These "neo-Kantians," however, suffer from the same problem as their intellectual progenitor. Morgan and Campbell base their analysis on "two key assumptions: (1) that a democratic political structure imposes constraints on the decision-making process by restricting the key decision makers' freedom of choice; and (2) that with regard to decisions for war, these constraints push toward peace (i.e., heads of state would be more likely to opt for war than those they govern) (1991, 189-90)." Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) find empirical support for Morgan and Campbell's first assertion but do not examine the second, more fundamental proposition. Like Kant, these authors do not deduce motivations or explain why leaders are more war-prone and the populace more pacific. While it might be understood as an alternative explanation of democratic pacifism, I see this work as complementary to the analysis offered here.
24. This suggests why "insulation" is an essential element of the totalitarian model. See Friedrich, Curtis, and Benjamin 1969.
25. This argument also implies that autocracies should initiate wars with democracies. Given the complexities of military strategy and the often-considerable gains from sur pise attack and preemption, however, who actually fires the first shot or crosses the border (the basis of most standardized codings of war "initiation") is a poor indicator of who actually provoked, or "caused," the war. In addition, since history is typically written by the victors (and, as I shall show, democracies win a disproportionate number of wars), even more subjective estimates of war initiation may well be biased. As a result, I do not place much faith in patterns of war initiation as a test of the theory presented here. Following the coding rules used in Table 1 , however, the correlation (gamma) between democracy and war initiation is correctly signed but very weak (-.04) and insignificant. To the extent that this result is valid, it must count against the theory.
26. Contradicting the "crusading" hypothesis, Russett finds that the surge in public support for the president following an aggressive foreign policy action (often referred to as the "rallyround-the-flag" phenomenon) is typically short-lived, with a half-life of no more than a month or two (1990, 94 28. This is a long-run, dynamic argument; it does not imply that all democracies are wealthier than all autocracies. The entire literature on the macroeconomic theory of the state directly contradicts that on the so-called developmental state. The latter approach asserts that strong, autonomous states have to deter social rent seeking and stimulate growth under conditions of late industrialization (see, e.g., Evans 1979). As I suggest in n. 15, I do not expect there to be a systematic difference between the level of rents extracted by social groups in democracies and autocracies. Moreover, the literature on the developmental state is generally mute on the motivations of state officials: Why do political leaders choose the "public" interest over their own private interests? The macroeconomic theory of the state suggests that strong, autonomous states will typically exploit, rather than develop, their societies except where they face what North (1981) has termed severe external constraints (analogous here to very low costs of exit). Interestingly, most, but not all, of the developmental states have experienced clear threats from other states (e.g., South and North Korea, Taiwan and China). In such polities, especially those producing far within their production possibility frontiers, this analysis predicts that states will opt for increased normal profits from growth over increased rents from redistribution. In the long run, the theory suggests that these developmental autocracies will either ossify and once again become a drag on development (as in the former Soviet Union) or liberalize (as in South Korea 31. See n. 19 above. As noted, at least one participant in each war is democratic (defined by a minimum score of 6 on an 11-point scale). The mean score of 5.60 suggests that the "average" winner in these 26 wars was autocratic, although there were more democracies (38) than autocracies (32) in the population (see Table 1 
